Anzac Day speech – one family story
The twist to this story is that the soldier (fellow ANZAC) that saved his life unbeknown to my grandfather was a farmer from NW NSW and lived near the small community of Wallabadah some 200km from where my grandfather lived but only 10km from where I was born and grew up.
My grandfather never forgot this soldier’s bravery who saved his life and for decades endeavoured to locate him, but records were difficult to locate and much was lost in the fog of war.
Once my grandfather finally found out his location, he promptly visited Wallabadah to thank this Anzac for saving his life but sadly this soldier had passed away a few years earlier.
My grandfather did visit his grave to pay his respect and thanks for rescuing him from the battlefield.
This ladies and gentlemen is the true meaning of the Anzac spirit and mateship.
Lest we forget.
The battle plan for Passchendaele 2
The objective was to capture Passchendaele in 3 phases:
1. (‘Red Line’)1200 yards from the start
2. (‘Blue Line’) a further 0.5 mile, then, using ‘Blue Line’ as a jumping offline, assault the village.
3. (‘Green Line’) 400 yards beyond the village.
Formation for the attack:
3 Div (Aust) would attack Passchendaele Ridge and village while the NZ Div would attack Bellevue spur. 3 division would move with 9 Brigade on the ridge on the right of its formation, less one Battalion given to the General Monash to capture each objective. The 38th was given the task of capturing Passchendaele.
In case the village held out, a Battalion on the right of 9 Brigade was specially reserved by Gen Monash for enclosing it from the south (and the NZ Div enclosing from the north).
The attack was to start at 5:25am – it would be slow with long halts on the successive objectives:
From 3:30am heavy rain fell, while moving along previously laid tape, the 34th Battalion came under heavy shelling, Lt T F Bruce (from Sydney) of the 36th Bn was killed in the shelling, Lt Col Mine (C.O 36th) while supervising the assembly, was knocked down by a shell, but continued to command.
At 4:20am the rain ceased, but at 5:25am the British barrage (while sounding effective afforded no screen and only light protection – one could clearly see through it all day.
The 9th Brigade went forward in the utmost confusion. It was supposed to move diagonally across the ridge and Passchendaele Road, parallel to the railway, but as the jumping offline (‘Blue Line’) was practically at right angles to the ridge, they tended to advance along the heights.
The 35th Battalion finally settled down after some horrific action including being fired on by field and heavy guns from hedges with about 100 men. They reported 25 – 30% causalities and 400 – 500 prisoners sent back. They established 3 posts on what Capt Carr (at that time during the action, the senior officer on the spot) thought was the second objective (‘Blue Line’) but which was short of the first objective. (‘Red Line’).
The Battalion selected to assault 9 Brigade’s final objective was the 36th. A report came along that it had gone through toward the final objective. Actually, it had advanced with the 35th but, on the left and had penetrated to the second objective, a half mile further on.
This position had been reconnoitred during the previous halt of the commander of its left company, Captain R A Goldrick. As no other battalion was there, he now established the line with its left on the road 600yds from the church about the point reached by the 66th division in Passchendaele 1 on the 9th of October.
By 10.55am Captain Carr (senior officer 35th) could see 4 division ahead on the right and the 36th on the left, but further left 10 brigade was far behind on the first objective (red line) German guns ahead were sniping with dreadful accuracy, Captain Carr like Major Giblin (10 brigade) on the western slope sent back for instructions. Something had gone wrong with the New Zealand attack.
They had met stiff opposition and had been unable to move far. Soon after noon General Monash (commander 3 division) received a pigeon message from captain R Gadd from the 36th’s front line “we are on blue line with composite force all three battalions, both flanks in air.
While general Monash had ordered the 9ths and 10th’s reserve battalions forward to outflank the Germans, he hadn’t told Major Giblin (10 brigade) or captain Carr (35th’Bn) at the front.
9 brigades’ line was still being battered by German guns, Captain Gadd (36’th) whose troops were being wiped out informed Captain Carr that Lt Col Milne (36’th) had come forward to hillside farm.
Carr sent Capt. Dixon with Gadd to explain to Milne the desperate nature of their situation .Milne said he would try to get their troops relieved after dark ,but until relieved they must hold on.
Meanwhile the German artillery was annihilating some parts of their line .Of the remaining officers of the 36’th Major Buchanan and Lt Putney had been killed and Capt Goldrick wounded and hr Mailer wounded.
At 3pm rain began falling, then at 3.15pm Gadd though agreeing with Carr that to hold on meant annihilation refused at first to retire (in view of his colonel’s orders).
With no word from Milne by 3.45pm Gadd agreed to withdraw along with the35th battalion.
They retired in confusion, while 10 brigade (Major Giblin) executed a well planned retirement.
